From the strategic point of view, military doctrines are subject to review from time to time. As for the two-front war, India has political and territorial disputes with both Pakistan and China. Hence it is its strategic need to consider a two-front war scenario. Such a threat is a nightmare even for a superpower. Seen in this context, this kind of threat to India is favourable for Pakistan. In 1962, China wanted Pakistan to generate a threat on the eastern border so as to dilute the Indian capability to fight China. Likewise, China took certain actions in the 1965 Pakistan-India war to help Pakistan.

It is a reality that India faces both military and non-military threats. Our strategy to provide the Kashmir struggle with diplomatic support is to dilute the Indian military capability against Pakistan. No future war can be fought without ‘operational synergy’, and a military strategy not assimilating this reality will always fail. We should not forget the lessons of the 1965 war and Kargil. It is the ABC of military strategy that a threat is a direct outcome of capability. Instead of rhetoric our military minds need to gauge the change in the Indian capability which can affect our response. India’s primary motive is to deter Pakistan from supporting the insurgency in Kashmir. It has displayed its military and diplomatic coercive powers in the past. Pakistan changed its position as the international environment had changed. We must focus on our external security to a point that war can be sustained till diplomacy takes over, because a military competition only will be suicidal for Pakistan. Pakistan can no more sustain the so-called threats to its security as their economic cost is too high. Likewise, prudent leaders do not indulge in a war of words, and in this context statements by some of our leaders have been totally superfluous.

Brig (R) Asif Alvi, Karachi